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Friday, April 08, 2011

Graupner v. Select Portfolio Servicing

Graupner v. Select Portfolio Servicing Filed 2/23/09 Graupner v. Select Portfolio Servicing CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).

This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT / DIVISION SEVEN CARMEN GRAUPNER et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v.SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING et al., Defendants and Respondents. B196401 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC318930) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Jon M. Mayeda, Judge. Reversed. Law Offices of Dale K. Galipo  Dale K. Galipo Douglas Pettibone for Plaintiffs ; Expert witness M.Soliman and Appellants Carmen and John Graupner. Duane Morris, Patricia P. Hollenbeck and Heather U. Guerena, for Defendants and Respondents Select Portfolio Servicing, Thomas D. Basmajian and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. Carmen and John Graupner appeal from the judgment entered after the trial court sustained, without leave to amend, the demurrers of Select Portfolio Servicing (Select Portfolio), Thomas D. Basmajian and J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. (Morgan Chase) to the Graupners fourth amended complaint. The Graupners, early victims of the subprime mortgage debacle, alleged eight causes of action, including breach of contract and fraud, arising from the foreclosure on their home in July 2003. We affirm the order sustaining the demurrers in part and reverse in part. Factual and procedural background 1. The Judicially Noticed Facts[1] The Graupners acquired their Apple Valley home through a grant deed executed on March 23, 2001 by Carmen Graupners aunt, Milagros Arceo.[2] They did not immediately record the deed. By November 2002 the loan obtained by Arceo was more than $15,000 in arrears, prompting issuance of a notice of default to Arceo. A notice of trustees sale identifying Arceo as the trustor was issued on February 21, 2003 setting the sale for March 13, 2003 (although the sale was later postponed). On July 11, 2003 the Graupners recorded the grant deed transferring the property to them in March 2001. At a trustees sale on July 28, 2003, the property was sold by credit bid (at the stated amount due) to Bank One, N.A., the predecessor to Morgan Chase. The trustees deed upon sale was recorded on September 24, 2003. 2. The Allegations of the Fourth Amended Complaint The fourth amended complaint, which is presented on the Judicial Council form for personal injury complaints, asserts causes of action for fraud, breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, intentional infliction of emotional distress, interference with contractual relations and prospective business advantage, abuse of process, negligence and breach of fiduciary duty. The pleading seeks compensatory as well as punitive damages. The Graupners allege that, as purchasers of the property and successors in interest to Arceo, they assumed her obligations under the note and the status of trustor under the deed of trust.[3] Citing no statutory authority in support of their assertions, they preface their claims with the general allegation that Fairbanks Capital Corporation (the former name of Select Portfolio), at the direction of Basmajian and Bank One, engaged in unfair, deceptive, and illegal collection practices with respect to the loan . . . and took actions to foreclose on the . . . property which were not warranted by contract or law.[4] As we understand the poorly drafted complaint, the Graupners made the following factual allegations in support of their claims against Select Portfolio, Basmajian and Morgan Chase (collectively respondents). On or about March 10, 2003 an agent of one of the named defendants ‑‑ neither the person nor the entity is identified ‑‑ led the Graupners to believe the loan could be reinstated if they were to make a downpayment of $3,500, followed by 12 payments of approximately $3,500 per month. The Graupners made the first payment of $3,500 but claim respondents breached the forbearance agreement three days later by adding assorted fees and interest (which the Graupners claim were usurious and not properly disclosed), thus raising the monthly payments to roughly $7,000. The Graupners made no further payments on the note but recorded the grant deed from Arceo on July 11, 2003. At some point before the July 28, 2003 trustee sale, of which they claim they were not properly notified, the Graupners allege they made a written offer to redeem the loan that Fairbanks Capital refused to accept. The foreclosure sale proceeded on July 28, 2003. On the one hand, the Graupners allege respondents fraudulently asserted the sale was final and title had been perfected. On the other hand, the Graupners allege they were told on or about September 22, 2003 (again by an unnamed agent of respondents) the foreclosure would be rescinded due to [respondents] acknowledgment that it had been improperly and fraudulently obtained; and any foreclosure sale or eviction proceeding would be postponed to at least October 30, 2003 to allow the [Graupners] to secure a third party buyer for the property to pay off the outstanding loan balance. According to the operative pleading, the Graupners found a third-party buyer for the property (the Woodmansees), but the buyers loan application was rejected after an appraiser submitted a grossly inadequate appraisal report with over 150 verifiable mistakes that failed to support the loan. Respondents allegedly breached this second agreement when they filed an unlawful detainer action on October 15, 2003 seeking to evict the Graupners from the property two weeks before the promised deadline. On October 30, 2003, following the rejection of the Woodmansees loan application, the Graupners allege respondents agreed to provide them with an additional 30 days to find a third-party buyer. This agreement, too, was breached on November 19, 2003 when Fairbanks Capital filed an application for a writ of possession to evict the Graupners from the property. 3. The Demurrers and the Order Sustaining Them The Graupners filed their original complaint alleging the same causes of action against eight defendants,[5]including the three respondents in this appeal, on July 23, 2004. The complaint alleged the appraisers had either intentionally or negligently appraised the property below its true market value, resulting in the rejection of the Woodmansees loan application. The Graupners initially served only GRL and Kelly. Kelly demurred to the complaint, and the trial court sustained his demurrer to all causes of action but granted leave to amend on all but the cause of action for abuse of process. The Graupners filed a first amended complaint, alleging additional facts relating to the defective appraisal, which again was asserted to be the cause of the rejection of the Woodmansees loan. Kelly successfully demurred to all causes of action except negligence, and the Graupners were allowed leave to amend only the fraud, breach of contract and implied covenant causes of action. Ruiz was dismissed from the action. The Graupners second amended complaint added allegations claiming they had been defrauded on July 23, 2003 and, on February 15, 2004, had entered into an oral or written agreement with Fairbanks Capital and Bank One to rescind the foreclosure to allow a third-party purchase. The Graupners also alleged Bank One and Fairbanks Capital concealed the posted sale date from them and failed to advise them of their right to postpone the sale. Kelly, GRL, Morgan Chase, Select Portfolio and Basmajian all demurred to the second amended complaint. At an August 15, 2005 hearing the trial court sustained Kellys demurrers without leave to amend and GRLs demurrers with leave to amend. Because these rulings required the Graupners to amend the complaint, the subsequently scheduled demurrers filed by the remaining defendants were taken off calendar. After prevailing on the demurrers, Kelly filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on the remaining negligence cause of action asserting, as a matter of law, he owed no duty to the Graupners. The court granted the motion on September 20, 2005. On August 29, 2005 the Graupners filed their third amended complaint. For the first time the Graupners alleged they became owners of the property through a grant deed executed on March 23, 2001.[6] They also alleged that, on or about February 15, 2004, they had entered into a written or oral agreement with respondents to rescind the foreclosure, an agreement that was breached on or about March 2, 2004. For the first time the Graupners also alleged Bank One and Fairbanks Capital had engaged in deceptive lending practices, citing the federal class action. The remainder of the third amended complaint continued to focus on the actions of the appraisers, again claiming the late delivery of a defective appraisal caused the Woodmansees to lose the loan. GRL, Morgan Chase, Select Portfolio and Basmajian again demurred. The court sustained GRLs demurrer without leave to amend and sustained the remaining demurrers with leave to amend. The Graupners filed the fourth amended complaint on December 21, 2005. For the first time the Graupners alleged they had made a written tender of reimbursement of the loan that had been declined by Fairbanks Capital. They also identified three separate agreements breached by Fairbanks Capital and Bank One, in contrast to the lone February 2004 agreement to rescind the foreclosure to allow the Graupners to secure a third-party buyer that had been alleged in earlier versions of the complaint. The remaining defendants demurred to the fourth amended complaint, asserting the Graupners lacked standing because they were not parties to the loan, which expressly restricted the use of the property to Arceo; there were no individual charging allegations with respect to Basmajian; allegations contained in the fourth amended complaint contradicted allegations contained in earlier versions of the complaint; the Graupners had once again failed to state any claims for relief; respondents conduct was privileged; and the Graupners should not be allowed further opportunities to amend. The trial court sustained the demurrers without leave to amend on the grounds the allegations did not sufficiently identify who made the alleged misrepresentations to the Graupners (fraud); the complaint failed to allege a valid contractual relationship (breach of contract and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing); the allegations did not support a finding respondents conduct was extreme or outrageous (intentional infliction of emotional distress); the Graupners had failed to allege respondents were aware of a valid contract between them and a third party (intentional interference with contractual relations); the alleged facts did not demonstrate respondents conduct was unlawful (abuse of process); and the Graupners failed to allege facts establishing respondents exceeded their role as lenders (negligence). Discussion 1. The Standard of Review on Appeal from Demurrer On appeal from an order dismissing an action after the sustaining of a demurrer, we independently review the pleading to determine whether the facts alleged state a cause of action under any possible legal theory. (McCall v. PacifiCare of Cal., Inc. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 412, 415; Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.) We give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, treat[ing] the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law. (Aubry, at p. 967; accord, Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126.) We liberally construe the pleading with a view to substantial justice between the parties. (Code Civ. Proc., 452; Kotlar v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1116, 1120.) Where the complaint is defective, [i]n the furtherance of justice great liberality should be exercised in permitting a plaintiff to amend his [or her] complaint. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital Dist., supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 970.) Leave to amend may be granted on appeal even in the absence of a request by the plaintiff to amend the complaint. (Id. at p. 971; see Code Civ. Proc., 472c, subd. (a).) We determine whether the plaintiff has shown in what manner he [or she] can amend [the] complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect of [the] pleading. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349.) [L]eave to amend should not be granted where . . . amendment would be futile. (Vaillette v. Firemans Fund Ins. Co. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 680, 685; see generally Caliber Bodyworks, Inc. v. Superior Court (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 365, 373-374.) 2. A Summary of Nonjudicial Foreclosure Proceedings Civil Code sections 2924 through 2924k[7]provide a comprehensive framework for the regulation of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale pursuant to a power of sale contained in a deed of trust. (Moeller v. Lien (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 822, 830 (Moeller).) In Moeller this court summarized the procedures leading to a nonjudicial foreclosure: Upon default by the trustor [under a deed of trust containing a power of sale], the beneficiary may declare a default and proceed with a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. [Citations.] The foreclosure process is commenced by the recording of a notice of default and election to sell by the trustee. [Citations.] After the notice of default is recorded, the trustee must wait three calendar months before proceeding with the sale. [Citations.] After the 3-month period has elapsed, a notice of sale must be published, posted and mailed 20 days before the sale and recorded 14 days before the sale. [Citations.] The trustee may postpone the sale at any time before the sale is completed. [Citations.] If the sale is postponed, the requisite notices must be given. [Citation.] . . . The property must be sold at public auction to the highest bidder. (Id.at p. 830.) During the foreclosure process, the debtor/trustor is given several opportunities to cure the default and avoid the loss of the property. First, the trustor is entitled to a period of reinstatement to make the back payments and reinstate the terms of the loan. [Citation.] This period of reinstatement continues until five business days prior to the date of the sale, including any postponement. [Citation.] In addition to the right of reinstatement, the trustor also possesses an equity of redemption, which permits the trustor to pay all sums due prior to the sale of the property at foreclosure and thus avoid the sale. . . . [] . . . A properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale constitutes a final adjudication of the rights of the borrower and lender. [Citation.] Once the trustees sale is completed, the trustor has no further rights of redemption. (Moeller, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at pp. 830-831.) 3. The Graupners Have Standing To Sue Respondents initially challenge the Graupners standing to bring the lawsuit, asserting the loan obtained by Arceo to purchase the property contained a rider requiring her to maintain control over the property for use as a second home and limiting her ability to transfer the property without the lenders prior written consent.[8] Real property is transferable even though the title is subject to a mortgage or deed of trust, but the transfer will not eliminate the existence of that encumbrance. Thus, the grantee takes title to the property subject to all deeds of trust and other encumbrances, whether or not the deed so provides. (Nguyen v. Calhoun (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 428, 438.) Although we disapprove of what appears to have been an evasive effort by the Graupners to obtain loan funding through Arceo when their own credit was insufficient to secure a loan, they correctly contend they became successor trustors when Arceo transferred the property back to them. Under section 2924(c), subdivision (a)(1), the Graupners, as successors to Arceo, acceded to the status of trustor and held the statutory right to cure the default on the loan. (See, e.g., Munger v. Moore (1970) 11 Cal.App.3d 1, 8 [[p]ursuant to Civil Code section 2924c, such successor has the statutory right to cure a default of the obligation secured by a deed of trust or mortgage within the time therein prescribed]; Whitman v. Transtate Title Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 312, 321 [[w]e believe the term trustor as used in [section 2924g,] subdivision (c)(1)[,] was intended to include also the successor in interest to the original trustor who at the time of the impending trustees sale is the owner of the property to be sold at the trustees sale].) 4. The Fourth Amended Complaint Adequately Alleges a Cause of Action for Wrongful Foreclosure As summarized above, the statutory scheme provides the trustor with opportunities to prevent a nonjudicial foreclosure by curing the default. The trustor may make back payments to reinstate the loan until five business days prior to the date of the sale, including any postponement. ( 2924c, subds. (a)(1), (e); Napue v. Gor-Mey West, Inc. (1985) 175 Cal.App.3d 608, 614.) Additionally, the trustor has an equity of redemption, which allows the trustor to pay all amounts due at any time prior to the sale to avoid loss of the property. ( 2903, 2905; Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 86-87.) The fourth amended complaint unambiguously alleges the Graupners attempted to assert their right to redemption and were wrongfully prevented from doing so by Fairbanks Capital: The Defendants Bank One, Fairbanks and Basmajian interfered with the Plaintiffs rights as owners, trustors, and successors in interest to the property to their right of equity of redemption, which permits the trustor to pay all sums due prior to the sale of the property at foreclosure, and thus avoid the sale. [] . . . The Defendants conducted an improper non-judicial foreclosure of the subject property because the trustees deed was never delivered and because the plaintiffs were not properly notified in advance of the sale as required by law, and by not continuing the foreclosure sale when the Plaintiffs were attempting to exercise their rights of reinstatement and equity of redemption. [] . . . The Defendants, specifically Fairbanks, also did not accept the Plaintiffs offer of tender to pay the entire balance due on the loan, despite the Plaintiffs written request. Although on this record it is impossible to tell if the tender made by the Graupners complied with statutory requirements,[9]the allegation remains sufficient to withstand demurrer. Technically, we do not view this allegation as supporting a claim for breach of contract because the provisions of sections 2903 and 2905 confer the right of redemption.[10] As explained by one court, The statutory scheme governing nonjudicial foreclosures does not expand the beneficiarys sale remedy beyond the parties agreement, but instead provides additional protection to the trustor: Statutory provisions regarding the exercise of the power of sale provide substantive rights to the trustor and limit the power of sale for the protection of the trustor. (Bank of America, N.A. v. La Jolla Group II (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 706, 712 (Bank of America).) The failure of the Graupners, however, to properly title their cause of action as one for wrongful foreclosure is irrelevant. (See, e.g., Bird, Marella, Boxer & Wolpert v. Superior Court (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 419, 427 [the nature of a cause of action does not depend on the label the plaintiff gives it]; Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. J. Lamb, Inc. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 1017, 1034 [scope of the duty does not depend on the labels given to the causes of action in the third party complaint ]; Ananda Church of Self-Realization v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1273, 1281 [[A] court is not bound by the captions or labels of a cause of action in a pleading. The nature and character of a pleading is to be determined from the facts alleged, not the name given by the pleader to the cause of action.].) The trial court thus erred in failing to allow the Graupners to proceed on this ground. Moreover, to the extent the Graupners allege the foreclosure was defective,[11]those allegations may be addressed as part of this cause of action. 5. The Trial Court Properly Concluded the Graupners Had Failed To Allege Any Further Causes of Action a. Breach of contract The fourth amended complaint alleges three separate oral agreements between the Graupners and respondents. The first allegedly occurred shortly before the originally posted sale date of March 13, 2003. The Graupners allege some unnamed agent of respondents promised they could reinstate the loan by making an initial downpayment of $3,500, followed by monthly payments of $3,500 for the next year.[12] The Graupners made the initial payment but, by their own admission, withdrew from the agreement when respondents presented them with a written forbearance agreement articulating a reinstatement plan including accumulated fees and interest, thus increasing the amount necessary to reinstate the loan.[13] Plainly, there was no meeting of the minds as to the specific terms of the reinstatement agreement; and the Graupners never completed their end of the alleged bargain. (See Nguyen v. Calhoun, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at pp. 444-445 [failure to tender full performance of oral agreement to postpone trustees sale did not justify invalidation of sale].) The Graupners also may not rest their claim on the alleged payment of $3,500 just days before the original March 2003 sale date. Because that sum was already owed to the beneficiary under the note, it cannot be viewed as consideration sufficient to render the alleged oral agreement enforceable. (See Raedeke v. Gibraltar Sav. & Loan Assn. (1974) 10 Cal.3d 665, 673 (Raedeke) [[i]n the absence of consideration, a gratuitous oral promise to postpone a sale of property pursuant to the terms of a trust deed ordinarily would be unenforceable under section 1698 [the statute of frauds]].) The second and third agreements allegedly arose post-foreclosure and are based on respondents purported promise to rescind the foreclosure and allow the Graupners to identify a third party (the Woodmansees) to purchase the property. By virtue of these alleged agreements, the Graupners apparently hoped to squeeze within the narrow confines of the Supreme Courts decision in Raedeke, supra, 10 Cal.3d 665, in which the Court concluded the trustors effort in identifying a third-party buyer constituted adequate consideration not contemplated by the loan agreement to allow them to state a cause of action for violation of an oral promise to postpone the sale. (Id. at p. 673.) But there are crucial differences between this case and the circumstances presented in Raedeke. To begin with, the agreements identified by the Graupners allegedly occurred after the foreclosure sale. To quote our decision in Moeller, A properly conducted nonjudicial foreclosure sale constitutes a final adjudication of the rights of the borrower and lender. [Citation.] Once the trustees sale is completed, the trustor has no further rights of redemption. (Moeller, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 831; see also Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1250; Knapp v. Doherty (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 76, 86-87.) The Graupners argue the sale was not final within the meaning of section 2924h because Fairbanks Capital had failed to record the trustees deed of sale within 15 days of the sale; but they have cited no authority, nor have we found any, suggesting their substantive rights (for instance, their right of redemption or right to postpone the sale under section 2924g) persisted after the sale date.[14] Further, in Raedeke the trustor was entitled to rely on the trustees agreement to postpone the sale because the trustor had successfully located a financially responsible buyer. (Raedeke, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 670.) By their own admission, the Graupners proposed third-party buyers did not qualify for the loan they sought, not because of anything done by respondents, but because of the failure of the appraiser to deliver a competent appraisal. Consequently, the Graupners failed to comply with their part of the alleged bargain. As to the third alleged agreement to extend the time for the Graupners to identify a buyer by 30 days, the Graupners have failed to allege any consideration for the oral agreement and are thus precluded from enforcing it. (See Raedeke, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 673.) Respondents demurrers were therefore properly sustained to this cause of action. b. Breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing A covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract in California. (Carma Developers (Cal.), Inc. v. Marathon Development California, Inc. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 342, 372; Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 589.) It implies a promise that each party will refrain from doing anything to injure the right of the other to receive the benefits of the agreement. (Aragon-Haas v. Family Security Ins. Services, Inc. (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 232, 240.) As the Supreme Court has observed, The covenant of good faith and fair dealing . . . exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other partys right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made. [Citation.] The covenant thus cannot be endowed with an existence independent of its contractual underpinnings. [Citation.] It cannot impose substantive duties or limits on the contracting parties beyond those incorporated in the specific terms of their agreement. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349-350 (Guz).) The Graupners cause of action for breach of the implied covenant is based on their three alleged oral agreements with respondents. As discussed, none of those oral agreements is enforceable.[15] In the absence of an enforceable contract, there can be no cause of action for breach of the implied covenant. (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 353.) c. Fraud The elements of fraud are a misrepresentation, knowledge of its falsity, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance and resulting damage. (Universal By-Products, Inc. v. City of Modesto (1974) 43 Cal.App.3d 145, 151.) In California, fraud must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suffice. [Citations.] Thus the policy of liberal construction of the pleadings . . . will not ordinarily be invoked . . . . [Citation.] . . . This particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered. (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645; accord, Murphy v. BDO Seidman, LLP (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 687, 692.) The objectives of the particularity requirement are to give the defendant notice of definite charges which can be intelligently met, and to permit the court to determine whether, on the facts pleaded, there is any foundation, prima facie at least, for the charge of fraud. (Committee on Childrens Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216-217; accord, Gil v. Bank of America, N.A. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1381.) The trial court afforded the Graupners four opportunities to meet these requirements. In their latest attempt, the Graupners again failed to identify specific, intentionally misleading statements made by particular people on which the Graupners relied to their detriment. Moreover, the alleged misrepresentations simply track the allegations the foreclosure proceedings were defective, created a contractual obligation we have already found unenforceable or occurred post-sale when respondents duties to the Graupners had expired. Moreover, the pleading inconsistencies in preceding versions of the complaint highlight the absence of factual allegations sufficient to apprise respondents of the nature of the purportedly fraudulent statements at issue. (See Manti v. Gunari (1970) 5 Cal.App.3d 442, 449 [although pleading inconsistent theories of recovery is permissible, a pleader cannot blow hot and cold as to the facts positively stated]; accord, Davaloo v. State Farm Ins. Co. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 409, 418.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in sustaining respondents demurrers to this cause of action. d. Negligence and breach of fiduciary duty The scope and nature of the trustees duties in a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding are exclusively defined by the deed of trust and the governing statutes. No other common law duties exist. (I.E. Associates v. Safeco Title Ins. Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 281, 287-288; Residential Capital v. Cal-Western Reconveyance Corp. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 807, 827; see also Kachlon v. Markowitz (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 316, 335 [trustee in a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding is not a true trustee with fiduciary duties, but rather a common agent for the trustor and beneficiary].) Moreover, the Graupners do not allege any facts that would support the inference of a separately assumed duty to them as successor trustors. Consequently, the trial court correctly sustained respondents demurrers to the negligence and breach of fiduciary duty causes of action. e. Intentional infliction of emotional distress The elements of a prima facie case of intentional infliction of emotional distress consist of: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intent to cause, or reckless disregard for the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) suffering of severe or extreme emotional distress by the plaintiff; and (3) the plaintiffs emotional distress is actually and proximately the result of defendants outrageous conduct. (Conley v. Roman Catholic Archbishop (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1133.) Extreme and outrageous conduct is behavior so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community. (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 965, 1001.) [I]t is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendants conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery. (Fowler v. Varian Associates, Inc. (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 34, 44.) We agree with the trial court the Graupners have failed to allege any conduct on the part of respondents that can reasonably be regarded as extreme and outrageous. Having failed to allege adequate facts to support a cause of action for fraud, we see no error by the trial court in sustaining respondents demurrers to this cause of action. f. Interference with contractual relations The elements of a cause of action for intentional interference with contract are (1) a valid contract between plaintiff and a third party; (2) defendants knowledge of this contract; (3) defendants intentional acts designed to induce a breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; (4) actual breach or disruption of the contractual relationship; and (5) resulting damage. (Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Bear Stearns & Co. (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1118, 1126.) The Graupners contend they had contractual relations with the Woodmansees, the prospective third-party buyers of the property, and respondents interfered with that agreement by breaching their oral agreements with, and their fiduciary duties to, the Graupners. Insofar as we have concluded the Graupners had no enforceable agreements with respondents and could not state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, the Graupners conclusory allegations of interference are not actionable. g. Abuse of process The tort of abuse of process is the improper use of the machinery of the legal system for an ulterior motive. (ComputerXpress, Inc. v. Jackson (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 993, 1014.) The torts essence is misuse of the power of the court; it is an act done in the name of the court and under its authority for the purpose of perpetrating an injustice. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1057; see also ComputerXpress,Inc., at p. 1014 [[b]ecause the purpose of the tort [of abuse of process] is to preserve the integrity of the court, it requires a misuse of a judicial process . . .].) To establish a cause of action for abuse of process, the plaintiff must demonstrate both a willful act in the use of process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceedings and an ulterior motive. (Rusheen, at p. 1057; Siam v. Kizilbash (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1563, 1579.) The Graupners allege the foreclosure and eviction proceedings were done in a wrongful manner with the specific intention of wrongfully removing the plaintiffs from the property and depriving the plaintiffs the right to keep the property. Whatever claims the Graupners may have arising from these proceedings, abuse of process is not one of them. Respondents correctly used the process as intended, both to accomplish a nonjudicial foreclosure and to evict the Graupners from the property after they refused to leave. (See Spellens v. Spellens (1957) 49 Cal.2d 210, 232 [[s]ome definite act or threat not authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not legitimate in the use of the process, is required; and there is no liability where the defendant has done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though with bad intentions].) 6. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Sustaining Basmajians Demurrer In Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d 490, the Supreme Court recognized that corporate directors may be jointly liable with the corporation and may be joined as defendants if they personally directed or participated in the tortious conduct. (Id.at p. 504.) Their liability, if any, stems from their own tortious conduct, not from their status as directors or officers of the enterprise. (Id.at p. 503; accord, Reynolds v. Bement (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1075, 1089.) [B]oilerplate allegations of conspiracy do not alter the situation. Agents and employees of a corporation cannot conspire with their corporate principal or employer where they act in their official capacities on behalf of the corporation and not as individuals for their individual advantage. (Reynolds, at p. 1090; cf. Falahati v. Kondo (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 823, 829 [boilerplate allegation in complaint that each defendant was the agent and employee of the others and charging allegations referring to defendants and each of them did not result in complaint stating a cause of action against individual not mentioned in body of complaint; adding that individuals name to the complaints caption did not help state a cause of action because the caption of the complaint constitutes no part of the statement of the cause of action].) The Graupners have failed in the fourth amended complaint to identify any action taken personally by Basmajian. The mere reference to an injunction entered in a different action is insufficient to bind Basmajian in this action. 7. The Trial Court Acted Within Its Discretion in Denying Leave To Amend on the Defectively Pleaded Causes of Action and May Condition Amendment of the Surviving Cause of Action on the Graupners Showing of Good Faith As we acknowledge above, [i]f there is any reasonable possibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend. (Youngman v. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245; see Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081 [leave to amend should be granted when the plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable possibility that he or she can amend any of her claims to state viable causes of action].) The trial court, however, has every right to guard against sham pleadings and to prevent abuse of the litigation process. For example, the trial court has discretion to deny leave to amend when the proposed amendment omits or contradicts harmful facts pleaded in a prior pleading unless a showing is made of mistake or other sufficient excuse for changing the facts. Absent such a showing, the proposed pleading may be treated as a sham. (Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 946; Amid v. Hawthorne Community Medical Group, Inc. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 1383, 1390.) The well-established rule is that a proposed amendment which contradicts allegations in an earlier pleading will not be allowed in the absence of very satisfactory evidence upon which it is clearly shown that the earlier pleading is the result of mistake or inadvertence. (American Advertising & Sales Co. v. Mid-Western Transport (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 875, 879; accord, Reichert v. General Ins. Co. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 836.) Ordinarily a court will permit an amendment to cure a mistake or inadvertent allegation, but it is not required to accept an amended complaint that is not filed in good faith, is frivolous or sham. (American Advertising & Sales Co., at p. 878.) The Graupners sole potentially viable claim of wrongful foreclosure is premised upon respondents alleged rejection of their tender of the full loan amount, an allegation curiously omitted from all previous versions of the complaint. We cannot, on this record, conclude this allegation was not made in good faith. Accordingly, the case may proceed based on their claim. We note, however, the trial court possesses powerful tools to shield other parties, as well as nonparties, from abusive litigation tactics. For example, the trial court could issue orders initially limiting any discovery to the issue of redemption and imposing strict controls on the order, timing and scope of that discovery. Then, if appropriate, the court could schedule an early hearing on a motion for summary judgment regarding the wrongful foreclosure claim. In addition, if there is reason to believe the amendments to the complaint are being presented for an improper purpose, sanctions may be available under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7 (see generally Day v. Collingwood (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1116; Banks v. Hathaway (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 949), as well as Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 (see generally Palm Valley Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Design MTC (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 553, 562-563). We leave these matters to the trial court to consider upon remand. DISPOSITION The judgment is reversed, and the matter remanded for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. All parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS PERLUSS, P. J. We concur: WOODS, J. ZELON, J. Publication courtesy of San Diego free legal advice. Analysis and review provided by Santee Property line attorney. San Diego Case Information provided by www.fearnotlaw.com --------------------------------------------------------------- [1] Although these facts were omitted from the Graupners pleadings, they were included in a request for judicial notice (consisting of duly recorded documents relating to the property) filed in support of Select Portfolios demurrers to the fourth amended complaint. The documents are proper subjects of judicial notice (see Evid. Code, 452, subd. (h)), and there was no objection to Select Portfolios request in the trial court or on appeal. Accordingly, we consider these facts in determining whether the demurrers were properly sustained. (See Evans v. City of Berkeley (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1, 20 [demurrer tests sufficiency of complaint based on facts included in the complaint, those subject to judicial notice and those conceded by plaintiffs].) [2] John Graupner originally acquired the property on May 25, 2000. On February 28, 2001 Carmen Graupner, as John Graupners spouse, executed a grant deed conveying her community property interest in the property to John as his sole property. On February 28, 2001 John conveyed the property to Arceo by way of grant deed. On March 2, 2001 Arceo executed a deed of trust on the property securing a $440,000 loan obtained by Arceo on February 28, 2001. Attached to the loan documentation was a second home rider, which expressly limited control and occupancy of the property to Arceo. All three documents were recorded on March 9, 2001. Notwithstanding the terms of the rider, Arceo transferred the property back to the Graupners a few weeks later. [3] The Graupners also allege Arceo assigned all of her property rights and rights in this action to the Plaintiffs. [4] In support of these general allegations the Graupners refer to a November 2003 class action initated by the Federal Trade Commission and the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development alleging deceptive loan and foreclosure practices on the part of Fairbanks and Basmajian. The Graupners allege they were victims of the same deceptive and illegal practices. This bare allegation is insufficient to state a claim in this action, but raises the question whether the Graupners (or Arceo) were members of the referenced class and made any claims in the settlement of the action. (See United States v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc., et al. (D. Mass., Sept. 4, 2007, CV03-12219) [modified stipulated final judgment and order, available at http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/cases/fairbanks/finalorder.pdf> (as of Feb.23, 2009)].) [5] The original defendants included Bank One National Association (now Morgan Chase), Fairbanks Capital Holding Corp., Fairbanks Capital Corporation (now Select Porfolio), Thomas D. Basmajian, Guaranty Residential Lending (GRL) (the entity that arranged the allegedly defective appraisal), Gary Ruiz (an employee of GRL), Randy Kelly (dba Kelly Appraisal Services) and T.C. Reynolds. [6] In previous versions of the complaint the Graupners simply alleged Arceo had assigned all of her rights with respect to the property to them. [7] Statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise indicated. [8] Respondents describe the loan as a Second Home Rider rather than a loan secured by a mortgage or deed of trust. Under section 2924, however, every transfer of an interest in property, other than in trust, made only as security for the performance of another act, is to be deemed a mortgage. The Supreme Court long ago stated, [t]he intention of the parties must govern, and it matters not what particular form the transaction may take. If the deed is made for the purpose of securing the payment of a debt, it is a mortgage, no matter how strong the language of the deed, or any instrument accompanying it, may be. (Beeler v. American Trust Co. (1944) 24 Cal.2d 1, 20.) [9] The doctrine of tender has been correctly summarized in this fashion: The rules which govern tenders are strict and are strictly applied, and where the rules are prescribed by statute or rules of court, the tender must be in such form as to comply therewith. The tenderer must do and offer everything that is necessary on his part to complete the transaction, and must fairly make known his purpose without ambiguity, and the act of tender must be such that it needs only acceptance by the one to whom it is made to complete the transaction. [Citations.] In other words, with respect to tender, it is a debtors responsibility to make an unambiguous tender of the entire amount due or else suffer the consequence that the tender is of no effect. (Nguyen v. Calhoun, supra, 105 Cal.App.4th at p. 439.) [10] Section 2903 states, Every person, having an interest in property subject to a lien, has a right to redeem it from the lien, at any time after the claim is due, and before his right of redemption is foreclosed. . . . The procedure for so doing is detailed in section 2905, which provides, Redemption from a lien is made by performing, or offering to perform, the act for the performance of which it is a security, and paying, or offering to pay, the damages, if any, to which the holder of the lien is entitled for delay. [11] The Graupners assert respondents acknowledged the foreclosure was defective but fail to identify the nature of any defect. To the extent the Graupners contend the defect arose from respondents failure to renotice the default and sale after the Graupners recorded their grant deed from Arceo in July 2003, that contention is wrong. Section 2924b requires notice to each trustor or mortgagor or his or her successor in interest whose interest was recorded as of the date of the notice of default. ( 2924b, subd. (c)(2)(A).) Section 2924g, governing procedures for postponing foreclosure sales, states: The notice of each postponement and the reason therefor shall be given by public declaration by the trustee at the time and place last appointed for sale. A public declaration of postponement shall also set forth the new date, time, and place of sale and the place of sale shall be the same place as originally fixed by the trustee for the sale. No other notice of postponement need be given. ( 2924g, subd. (d), italics added.) [12] Section 2924g, subdivision (c)(1)(C), expressly permits the trustor and beneficiary to enter into a written or oral agreement to postpone a sale. (Cf. Bank of America, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 712 [statutory limit on trustors right to cure default does not prohibit voluntary reinstatement after prescribed statutory period: We seriously doubt that the Legislature intended to prevent lenders and borrowers from adjusting delinquencies by mutual consent.].) [13] Again, to the extent the Graupners contend particular fees were improper, they must allege specific statutory or contractual violations within the context of their cause of action for wrongful foreclosure. [14] The reviewing court is not required to make an independent, unassisted study of the record in search of error or grounds to support the judgment. . . . Accordingly, every brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration. (9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Appeal, 701, p. 769; see Guthrey v. State of California (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1116 [plaintiff waived alleged error in appeal from summary judgment by citing only general legal principles without relating them to the evidence].) [15] Plainly, the original loan agreement would be capable of supporting a claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith. Although respondents argue a mortgage loan, which is a contract based upon an individuals credit, is not assignable (see 1 Witkin: Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Contracts, 718, p. 803), we need not decide whether the Graupners, who, as successor trustors, were subject to the terms of the loan (see Munger v. Moore, supra, 11 Cal.App.3d at p. 8), may allege a breach of the covenant. Under the statutory scheme for nonjudicial foreclosure, the covenant of good faith is coextensive with respondents duty to conduct the foreclosure proceedings fairly, openly and in good faith. (See, e.g., Baron v. Colonial Mortgage Service Co. (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 316, 323-324 [Courts have also enunciated a duty in the trustee in the conduct of a sale itself. A sale under a power in a mortgage or trust deed must be conducted in strict compliance with the terms of the power. The sale must be made fairly, openly, reasonably, and with due diligence and sound discretion to protect the rights of the mortgagor and others, using all reasonable efforts to secure the best possible or reasonable price. [Citation.] That duty may thus fairly be said to extend to all participants in the sale, including prospective bidders.]; Block v. Tobin (1975) 45 Cal.App.3d 214, 221 [trustee owes a duty to conduct the sale fairly and openly and to secure the best possible price for the benefit of the trustor].) All rights protected under (c) 2005 Fearnotlaw.com

Wednesday, January 05, 2011

WE ARE BACK

You’vemay have joined a select group of consumer homeowners who are a growing category of victims of a highly illegal Real Estate fraud. Transfers of reality have occurred and in open and notorious manner. Notes and Mortgages set forth the claim to assignment and security rights contract that are void ab initio pursuant to Civil Code §1572 and/or will be avoided and recovered under 11 U.S.C. §548(a)1(b)(3) as fraudulent transfers and obligations.


I opineas an expert witness testifying in the matter of an unlawful transfer of title under a controlled sale. The accounting requirements necessary to evidence a valid repurchase of the loan alleged sold cannot survive scrutiny for which the sale is void due to a controlling elements of parties of interest. An open market transaction “OMT” must be conducted in a sterile uninfluenced environment. Only then will it qualify as a true highest bid for which a prevailing party is by chance can claim title rights as both the beneficiary and the grantee.

It is a continuation of the ongoing and running predatory acts against title conducted in an adverse manner by hostile parties’ engaged in an operative method and means for appearing to have met the accounting requirements necessary to reclaim assets charged to a write down and complete loss. Divestment of the note is a known Wall Street corollary for securitizing receivables financed on FDIC member bank lines of credit. Testimony intends to demonstrate the impossible foreclosure efforts by parties of interest that sold away such interest in the subject loan at the time of execution to the secondary.

These allegations if brought will be supported by meritorious claims in arguments citing “Enron” breach of accounting rules FAS 140 and SFAF 140-3 with respect to controlling a sale for purposes of recognition of the asset sold earlier.

Withholding of the government’s role for purposes of profiting in an private parties rules enforcement is a violation of civil code and USC as well as raising speculation for a violation of one’s civil liberties’ and constitutional amendments. A secretive an opaque method of conducting an open market bid deprives a title holder of thither constitutional rights to own property and live free of any threat against the seizure of house and title to home.

I opine from an insider advantage that Parties seeking to gain from the sale of the Milner property have conducted themselves under a secretive financing arrangement or counter parties understandings, as in a FDIC award through subrogation’s claim.

The winning bid is woefully insufficient to claim a senior right to enforce title recovery for a sale having occurred under the authority of the United States government. These types of rigged bid sales are non-complaint due to withholding information for an advantage and enhanced preferential treatment of parties alleging to have won the title in an open bid. This is what we have gathered to date for your assistance in the matter of a wrongful transfer of title. We would like to have you – “Milners” counsel reviews the following for immediate consideration of merit and for furthering a synergistic effort for his or her preference in arguments.

Tuesday, October 26, 2010

FDIC Issues Final Safe Harbor Rule

Preemption . . . party over?


The final rule amending 12 C.F.R. § 360.6 (the “Securitization Rule”) has made for a tough month for us and it is still not over. We felt very strongly at the beginning of year that the FDIC would do the inevitable. Accounting and legal professionals practicing securities law said they were going to do it—and now, some critics say, “They’ve really done it.”

Thwre now is a face behind MERS people. Only less than 30 days ago the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) resolved by a four-to-one vote to issue a final rule amending 12 C.F.R. § 360.6 (the “Securitization Rule”) relating to The FDIC’s treatment, as conservator or receiver, of financial assets transferred by an insured depository institution(“IDI”) in connection with a securitization or participation.

The FDIC’s role as conservator or receiver, of financial assets transferred in connection with a securitization or participation.

Securitization Rule, adopted in 2000, was premised, that the FDIC capitalized on the opportunity to address at the same time perceived structural failures inherent in the “originate to sell” securitization model widely believed to have contributed to the recent financial meltdown.

Securitization is the fraud and not the Robo Hobo’s who contract government agents are. . It’s just like any other sale of assets by an originator, may become suspect if implemented when an originator is on the brink of bankruptcy. The potential for such suspect actions, however, is not unique to securitization transactions. The same issues would arise, for example, if on the eve of bankruptcy an originator sold, or borrowed money by encumbering, a factory or equipment and similarly sought to dissipate the sale or loan proceeds. Such questionable uses of proceeds are more appropriately addressed by preference and fraudulent conveyance laws

If your out for the count consider securitization that increases overall value by providing a new source of financing, the capital markets, whose rates are systematically lower than the rates at which many companies commonly borrow. So long as the added transaction costs are less than the interest saved by using securitization instead of secured financing, there is a net gain. Last year, changes in accounting rules for securitizations called into question the effectiveness of the Securitization Rule. Modifications to GAAP through FAS 166 and 167 have made it significantly more difficult to achieve sale accounting treatment for transfers of assets in securitizations.

Specifically, the change required that the underlying assets of some bank sponsored securitizations be consolidated on the balance sheets of the sponsoring banks. In addition to raising questions about the treatment of existing transactions that are required to be brought on selling institutions’ balance sheets, this development has also raised questions about whether, and under what circumstances, on-balance sheet securitizations should be covered by the legal isolation safe harbor, considering that many such transactions require legal isolation certainty in order to obtain external ratings or to satisfy investors’ due diligence concerns.3 And so, in an effort to address many of the above concerns, November, 2009, the FDIC issued a transitional interim rule protecting existing securitizations complying with the Securitization Rule until March 31, 2010 at which time a new rule would be put in place

The current interim rule grandfathers all  changes issued prior to March 31, 2010that otherwise comply with the old safe harbor rule, so long as those securitizations meet the requirements for sale treatment under GAAP prior to the effective date of the new Financial Accounting Statements 166 and 167 (January 1, 2010).

M.Soliman
expert.witness@live.com



Monday, October 18, 2010

IMPOSSIBLE RECOVERY

The lender as Defendant willfully slanders title to real property held by Plaintiffs (first) (last) as it fails to demonstrate where any successor's holds sufficient and adequate rights of ownership or relies solely upon the electronic recording method. Special privileges afforded an FDIC member bank; Mortgage Banker and Mortgage Servicer no more exist herein than do a statutory interpretation for a revised conventional foreclosure employed by FDIC contract legal services disguised a debt collections effort for a receiver.

 A mortgage loan is in foreclosure and placed into receivership is an impaired asset no longer possibly secured by real property. Forfeiture causes an accounting controversy through the use of a mortgage note and electronic entry to evidence the existence of the encumbrance of that realty for which granting of a mortgage secures the certificates and not the loan. In accounting management an encumbrance is a management tool used to reflect commitments in the accounting system and attempt to budget as would be the case.

 A receiver appointed over certain assets in question under any circumstances will ledger accordingly. Encumbrances allow the FDIC to recognize future commitments of resources prior to an actual expenditure. It's documented by the receiver appointed and not necessarily in your production request to the FDIC. We can assist here.

 The foreclosure represents a "pre-encumbrance" and is the amount expected to be allocated or to "spend", but for which there is no legal obligation exists to spend.

 A requisition by the FDIC member bank subsequent to sale is the evidence of no condition the "precedes" the sale. It's documented as a budgetary line item in advance of the sale and is for a general ledger debit posted against the appropriate account conceived by and for a receiver deemed a typical pre-encumbrance transaction. It is posted against the appropriate account in favor of the successor by assignment under the FDIC subrogation claims adjustor at time of sale.

 Robo signatures and documents that lack integrity are something the State courts care not to influence the overwhelming evidence for which the debtor defaulted.  District courts will entertain with greater care in it opine due to diversity and requirement for maintaining the statutory requirements versus a bias for statutory and judicial interpretation. 

 .Soliman

expert.witness@live.com

   

 

Thursday, October 14, 2010

TRUSTEE & TRUSTEE DEFINITIONS



TRUSTEE'S DEED
The deed issued by a trustee to the highest bidder at a trustee's sale. The deed discloses on its face what the opening or minimum bid was at the sale and what the final winning bid actually amounted to.

 TRUSTEE'S SALE
This is a non-judicial auction of real property, conducted by a trustee in the exercise of the power of sale clause, pursuant to the terms of the defaulted deed of trust.

TRUSTEE'S SALE GUARANTEE (TSG)
A special title report, for trustees only, that discloses all items pertaining to the ownership interests and encumbrances on a property in foreclosure. Also included is a list of all parties who recorded a special request to be notified if any NOD or NTS is filed against the particular trust deed in foreclosure. Furthermore it gives the trustee a list of all the local publications that qualify to advertise the Notice of Trustee's Sale (once a week for three consecutive weeks). It's also a contract of indemnification that protects the trustee and the beneficiary from the consequences of any title record error in their foreclosure proceeding.



  
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        

Experts Corner: Another FDIC Bank Failure

American Marine Bank

News of another FDIC member bank falling under the FDIC control was published late this week. The “Emerald City” is the latest to be welcomed back to join the party! Characteristic of the FDIC bulletins that we have come to be familiar with in 2008 and 2009, we are told if you had a loan with American Marine Bank, the friends and family members at the FDIC want you to continue to make your payments as usual.

Our question is to whom? Who is the holder in due course?The purpose of this analysis and discussion of the FDIC are subject to the various parties’ who have interest in your loan. It’s about their representations, conduct and decisions made while enforcing a foreclosure. Making a bad decision or employing conduct viewed to be deceptive will cause any transaction or enforcement of a right to a security to be rendered voidable.

Furthermore the asset may suffer from malfeasance and willful error and omissions causing the loan to be valued far below its market value due to serious impairment. Successfully demonstrating in court the reasons why your loan has become so seriously impaired that the real security, a deed of trust or mortgage, will fall into a judicial abyss and subject the true holder in due course to lose its rights to in a recovery of the asset in a foreclosure. In other words the right to accelerate and foreclose becomes lost to the transaction

Your loan was likely sold after it originated. A sale of the asset versus a government backed insurance guaranty is the single most controversial component of the subprime lenders dilemma.

A bonifide sale and transfer must be evidenced which differentiates the private label loans from the GSE or Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac class of loans delivered to Wall Street.

In a true sale the lender who sold it is lost to the privileges and rights to the asset forever. So I guess the question is not so much about a foreclosure due to a breach and delinquent obligation. This discussion is for us to understand to “whom” you owe the money and what right do they have to enforce the obligation and right to foreclose? Lawful Transfers



A “transfer” is the “streets” vernacular for booking a sale of a loan or pool of loans. The transfer of an asset by the lender to a less than arms investor is routinely conducted solely for accounting purposes. None the less it’s a sale that is forever entered in to the books.



The purpose of this analysis and discussion of the FDIC are subject to the various parties’ representations and decision making that may cause the asset to become so impaired that the real security, a deed of trust or mortgage becomes lost to the transaction. My last sale as a trader was a transfer of a bulk pool of “toxic waste” was back in 2001. The loans acquired and sold under my direction were never really that bad as we had one of the lowest delinquency rates in the region for sub prime assets sold and serviced. What I do know or at least remember from my days of bulk whole loan trading was from selling to the same major market leaders who are in trouble today.



Let’s back up for a moment to consider how accountants arrive at a specific value. A valuation is necessary for a foreclosure to take place just as it is for the original loan to be sold. A sale involves a contract and the essential elements f the law amongst the two parties. The first is consideration (money) and the second is the intent of the parties for lawful exchange and or transfer.



Consideration is required for transferring any good or service amongst one party to another, including a sale of a bulk pool of mortgage loan receivables.

If a mortgage is valued at par then you typically measure its worth at the combined cost to date or basis in the asset. A true and more accurate valuation is based upon the market and what one will pay assuming demand. It’s the true inherent value of a gallon of milk that will force someone to go elsewhere or not to drink milk at all. The same rationale holds true for an asset such as a closed mortgage receivable subject to its ability to attract a fair price in an open market. A mark to market value is entered by an accountant prior to sale if the owner is seeking to value the worth of the assets it holds.



Estimating value based on the future worth of an asset is something that continues to attract criticism whereby a historical valuation is entered based on a discounted future value. A presumption of value is calculated in a variety of ways sometimes using an internal rate of return offset by depreciation. In the mortgage industry I call this type of valuation complete lunacy. And this is where things get interesting with taking a look back at the cause of the mess we are now in.



Generally Accepted Accounting Principals aka “GAAP” allows us a standard to apply a historical value on a loan which is necessary for estimating consistency as with the life of a loan. The terms of the note say 30 years but we know that homeowners rarely keep a loan to term. Valuations use variables such as prepayment velocity or life based on a traditional or historic early payoff.



The CPR is the measurement of prepayment speed determine from reversion (sale of a home) refinance or the opposite end of the spectrum which is delinquency and default. Mortgages originated over the last decade were attributed an estimated holding time or CPR of say 60 months. Other things that influence price and for understanding the lenders desire to become fixated with the sub prime mortgage sector are subject to ethical scrutiny. I am referring to extreme maximum leverage used to buy loans and the introduction of something called accounting practices such as derecongnition. The latter is suspect, according to many accountants, as it offer no real value to a transfer and subject to entering a “gain on sale.”



The "streets" ability to substantiate its reporting methods. The Expert Witness must have among other things a legal understanding and verifiable accounting practices background. So figure an offshore investor will take a coupon of 1% at twice the current alternative which was a US Treasury. So I guess a WAC of 8% would yield on $100,000 certificate up to $800,000 in capital investment. Or is that $100,000 yielding 8 separate $100,000 certificates?



What ever it is its six of one and half a dozen of the other. It makes me want to run to the Hampton's and buy the biggest home they can offer. It makes me want to find the worse of the worse credit and put them into a loan.....any loan.



The problem with this madness conducted under the great GWB (and side kick “Don't call me Cheney call me "Dick”) administration is the regulatory absence for the bubble Wall Street elite would eventually pop.



The money raised was at a huge multiple and was causing CDO product to suffer from heavy demand internationally in a market that had long exceeded capacity. ( . . . .It makes me cringe and recall the old Keystone Kops silent flicks; remember the morons running around that said nothing and were always trying to help while and causing even more chaos …..Anyway!



I cannot pinpoint of fully grasp the role of the FDIC here but fear we may have an accounting play that shows the bank lines were actually used as “paid in capital” . It’s called derecongnition under GAAP and FASB accounting pronouncements for isolating the source and use of funds.



Will this help your arguments to save your home? YOU BET IT WILL! The big question is where the logic here is and why would the bank regulators let this happen? These Pretender Lenders were not pretenders at all. I call them “Tender Lenders” who tendered a note like currency instead of parking it in a vault like the asset it is. Therefore when tendered the check is electronically debited (hmm) and treated like a cancelled check.



The lost note is not a coat lost by a child at school. It’s lost to the payee who failed to deliver to the payor that check evidencing a debit stamped paid in full.



Hey, Barney just a minute . . . Hey, Wilma I’m home!!!!! So lets say these guys raised volumes of cash at huge multiples and did so with FDIC capitalization or tax payer insured capital contributions into a “NewCo” or De novo or S*P* E*.



If so, I feel the SPE is more like an STD and its all absolute "Bull Crepes". Where did these guys put all the capitalization anyway from money and stock…Huh? Especially with all these stringent FDIC risk weight capital set aside requirements. It’s a regulatory capital priority and basic fiscal mandate enforced by the OTS.



I got to know, where did they "Deposit" the money and stock ...do you know? I am referring to the "Deposits by the Wall Street “Depositors” you see. Deposited, Depositor, Depository, Restroom, tell me Wendy! Where’s the beef! Howard, who goofed I must known, who goofed!



Hey! ....wait a minute!!!....D*E*P*O*S*I*T*O*R*S! Yikes…OMG! How much more can we take!



So back to the failure of another institution, one of Americas and Pacific Northwest’s finest! American Marine Bank. So who do we bring an action against now? FDIC say’s “for all questions regarding “new” loans and the lending policies of the new successor call Columbia State Bank, and to please contact your branch office.



They continue that shares of American Marine Bank were owned by its holding company, AMB Financial Services Corporation, Bainbridge Island, WA. The holding company was not included in the closing of the bank or the resulting receivership. So if you are a shareholder of AMB Financial Services Corporation, please do not contact or file a claim with the Receiver. You may contact AMB Financial Services Corporation directly for information. How convenient is that….a BK waiting to happen.





The FDIC claims it does offer a reference guide to deposit brokers acting as agents for their investor clientele. This web site outlines the FDIC's policies and procedures that must be followed by deposit brokers when filing for pass-through insurance coverage on custodial accounts deposited in a failed FDIC Insured Institution. Wait a minute here now just slow down. FDIC makes no mention of a lender consumer grievance, and tells us to call the broke parent of the bank. Now are these loans in question considered FDIC troubled assets? Okay, we cannot help you with a predator loan but we will be back to foreclose on you?



My heart is pounding right now and I cannot take anymore folks…..really! But on a more serious note, consider the following. A bad notary signature, broken promise by a “Tender Lender” or forged MERS document is not the argument to bet the house on (no pun intended) It won’t get you to the promised land so can the need for an audit. It won’t get you to the Promised Land, so here is my advice!







SAVE YOUR MONEY! . . . UNLESS YOU WANT TO BORE THE HELL OUT OF A JUDGE AND GET THROWN OUT OF COURT.



It’s time to step up or step down!





By "Toxic Waste Guru" (LOL)



M.Soliman



expert.witness@live.com



REQUIREMENTS OF THE APPLICABLE CUSTODIAN .

(ii) If Custodian determines that the documents in the MortgageFilefor a Delivered Mortgage Loan conform in all respects with Section3(b)(i),and unless otherwise notified by Buyer in accordance with Section3(b)(i),Custodian shall include such Mortgage Loan in the CustodialMortgage LoanSchedule issued to Buyer.

If the documents required in any Mortgagedonot conform (except as otherwise notified in Section 3(b)(i)),Custodianshall not include such Mortgage Loan in any Custodial Mortgage LoanSchedule. Custodian shall notify Sellers and Buyer of any documentsthatare missing, incomplete on their face or patently inconsistent andof anyMortgage Loans that do not satisfy the criteria listed above.Sellers shallpromptly deposit such missing documents with Custodian or completeorcorrect the documents as required by Section 3(a) or remove therelatedMortgage File from the Request for Certification.

On or prior tothePurchase Date and as a condition to purchase, except with respectto aWet-Ink Mortgage Loan, Custodian shall deliver to the Buyer anelectronicCustodial Mortgage Loan Schedule to the effect that the Custodianhasreceived the Mortgage File for each Purchased Mortgage Loan on theMortgageLoan Schedule and as to each Mortgage File, specifying any documendelivered and any original document that has not been received, andverifying the items listed in this Section 3(b).(c) As required by Section 3(a), Custodian shall deliver to Buyer,nolater than 3:00 p.m. Eastern Time on the related Purchase Date(provided, thatthe

Custodian has timely received the items required in Section2(b) herein),electronically or via facsimile, followed, if requested in writingby Buyer, byovernight courier, a Custodial Mortgage Loan Schedule havingappended thereto aschedule of all Mortgage Loans with respect to which Custodian hascompleted theprocedures set forth in Sections 3(a) and 3(b)(i) hereof andcertify that it isholding each related Mortgage File for the benefit of Buyer inaccordance withthe terms hereof.

Pleading (Not for Use) Lenders egregious, ongoing and far reaching fraudulent schemes

COMPLAINT ---------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION COME NOW THE PLAINTIFF, IN THIS MATTER AND CASE that arises out of Defendants' egregious and ongoing and far reaching fraudulent schemes for improper use of of Plaintiff's identity, negligent and/or intentional misrepresentation of appraised fair market value upon which Plaintiff was contractually bound to rely and factually entitled to rely, fraud in the inducement, fraud in the execution, usury, and breaches of contractual and fiduciary obligations as Mortgagee or "Trustee" on the Deed of Trust. Claims further cite the "Mortgage Brokers," "Loan Originators," "Loan Seller","Mortgage Aggregator," "Trustee of Pooled Assets", "Trustee or officers of Structured Investment Vehicle", "Investment Banker", "Trustee of Special Purpose Vehicle/Issuer of Certificates of 'Asset-backed Certificates'", "Seller of 'Asset-Backed' Certificates (shares or bonds)," "Special Servicer" and Trustee, respectively, of certain mortgage loans pooled together in a trust fund. 2. The participants in the securitization scheme described herein have devised business plans to reap millions of dollars in profits at the expense of Plaintiff and other investors in certain trust funds 3. In addition to seeking compensatory, consequential and other damages, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as to what (if any) party, entity or individual or group thereof is the owner of the promissory note executed at the time of the loan closing, and whether the Deed of Trust (Mortgage) secures any obligation of the Plaintiff, and A Mandatory Injunction requiring reconveyance of the subject property to the Plaintiff or, in the alternative a Final Judgment granting Plaintiff Quiet Title in the subject property. FACTS SUMMARY OF THE FACTS OF THIS CASE 4. Plaintiff is the nominal payor on the subject promissory Note. The Loan Seller is a financial institution that was paid a fee to pose as a residential mortgage lender, when in fact the source of loan funds and the actual lender (Investors in Certificates) and underwriter (Mortgage Aggregator and Investment Banker) were other parties whose identities and receipt of fees and profits were withheld from Plaintiff at Closing and despite numerous requests continue to be withheld from Plaintiff by the Defendants contrary to the requirements of Federal Law and applicable State Law. 5. Unknown to Plaintiff, the Loan Seller, acting as principal in its relationships with the "independent appraiser" of the property and the mortgage broker and mortgage originator, induced the Plaintiff into a transaction that did not and could not meet normal underwritingstandards for a residential mortgage. The Loan Seller posed as a conventional mortgage lender thus leading Plaintiff to reasonably believe that the Loan Seller, the mortgage broker, and the loan originator had an interest in the success( repayment of the loan) of the transaction that Plaintiff was induced to believe was being executed at the time of the "closing" of the subject loan transaction. 6. In fact, the Loan Seller, mortgage broker, appraiser, loan originator, title agent, escrow agent and Trustee on the Deed of Trust, had no financial stake (i.e., liability) in the transaction andno interest other than obtaining Plaintiff's signature on a "loan" that could never be repaid, contrary to representations and assurances from the conspiring participants in this fraudulent scheme. In fact, the "Appraisal" was intentionally and knowingly inflated along with other loan data to justify the closing of the "loan transaction." 7. Plaintiff relied upon the due diligence of the apparent "Lender" (i.e., actually the Loan Seller) in executing the and accepting the closing documents. In fact, no "lender" was involved in the closing in the sense of an entity performing due diligence and evaluation pursuant to national standards for underwriting and evaluating risk of loaning money in a residential loan closing. 8. Thus no bank or other financial institution actually performing under the standards, rules and regulations governing such institutions was the "lender" which is the basis for Plaintiff's cause of action for usury, to wit: that the inflated appraisal added an undisclosed cost to the loan which when added to the other terms, disclosed and undisclosed, and amortized over the real expected life of the "loan" exceeds the limits set by the State legislature for usury and is not subject to exemption because the presence of a financial institution in the transaction was a ruse in which the form of the transaction covered over and mislead the Plaintiff as to the real parties in interest and the fees generated by the production of the subject "loan transaction." Their purpose was solely to collect fees, rebates, kickbacks and profits that were never disclosed to Plaintiff and have only recently been discovered by Plaintiff through consultation with experts in securitization of residential mortgage loans, and diligent research including the filings of some parties with the Securities and exchange Commission which disclose the normal manner of operating this fraudulent scheme. 10. Plaintiff has repeatedly requested and demanded compliance with Qualified Written Requests under Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Truth in Lending Act, and other applicable state and Federal Statutes which the Defendants have either ignored or refused to acknowledge or refused to resolve, copies of which demands are attached hereto as Exhibits and incorporated herein. 11. Plaintiff's Counsel and other professionals hired by Plaintiff have conducted interviews with witnesses and have personally observed the practices and facts alleged herein. Besides theobvious theft of identity which lies at the core of the pattern of conduct defining the Defendants' illegal and fraudulent scheme, it is observably obvious that the property was appraised improperly, never verified despite "stringent" underwriting standards imposed by Government Sponsored Entities (interim investors) with which the Defendants purported to comply (and did not) to wit: the appraisal report attached hereto and incorporated herein clearly shows the fair market value of the site (without improvements) quadrupling in less than 24 months and then returning to original value within 6 months after the closing of the "loan" transaction. 12. Further, no less than three legal persons apparently claim to have performed the appraisal only two of which are shown to have received compensation and one of which is already admitted as merely being a pass-through vehicle of Quicken Loans by which Quicken Loans could claim, but not earn, additional undisclosed fees. Upon information and believe Defendant (name) may have performed the only review for appraisal services although the appraisal report was apparently produced by Defendant Cornerstone for a fee of $450 onto which the stamped signature of Defendant Quintero appears. Quintero does not claim to be an employee of Cornerstone and is believed by Plaintiff to be an "independent contractor". The settlement statement also reports an appraisal fee to Defendant TSI, which is a vehicle through which Quicken Loans improperly charges borrowers undisclosed fees and does not perform any work whatsoever. 13.The Loan Seller was named as the Payee on the subject promissory note and the beneficiary under the mortgage terms allegedly securing the performance under the subject note. The "Trustee" was named as the Trustee on the Deed of Trust executed at the time of the alleged"closing" of the "loan transaction." In accordance with State law, the Deed and terms of security were recorded in the county records. 4.Notwithstanding the above, and without the knowledge of the Plaintiff, the Loan Seller had entered into Assignment and Assumption Agreements with one or more parties and Pooling and Service Agreements with one or more parties including but not limited to the mortgage aggregator prior to or contemporaneously with the "Closing" of the subject "loan transaction." 14.1. Under the terms of these agreements, the Loan Seller received a sum of money, usually on receiving an application for a loan equal to the gross amount of the loan sought by Plaintiff plus a fee of 2.5% or more which was allocated to the subject loan transaction. 15.Contrary to the documents presented before and during the "closing" of the "loan transaction" the Loan Seller was neither the source of funding nor the "Lender." 15.1. Thus at the time of recording, the source of funding and the "Lender" was a different entity than the nominal mortgagee or beneficiary under the deed of trust and was neither named nor disclosed in any fashion. 15.2. The security for the "loan" thus secured an obligation that had been paid in full by a third party. Said third party(ies) was acting as a financial institution or "Lender" without even having been chartered or registered to do so despite regulations to the contrary from laws and rules of State or Federal authorities and/or agencies. 16.Some form of documentation represented by the Loan Seller to the Mortgage Aggregator was presented before or contemporaneously with the "closing" of the loan" transaction. In some cases the documentation included actual copies of the documents presented at "Closing." 16.1. In most cases it consisted of either forged blank notes or vague descriptions of the content of the notes that were placed into the pool of assets that would be "securitized." 16.2. Plaintiff has discovered numerous cases in which the "loan closing" either did not take place at all or included documentation substantially different than the original offer and acceptance and substantially different than what could have been reported to the Mortgage Aggregator prior to the "closing." Plaintiff has discovered numerous cases in which foreclosure has proceeded despite the fact that no loan closing was ever consummated, no papers were ever signed, or the loans were properly rescinded properly under law. 17.Plaintiff does not know what version of documentation was presented to the MortgageAggregator and if the Mortgage Aggregator took one or more varying descriptions of the alleged "loan documents" into more than one pool of assets which was eventually sold for the purpose of securitizing the assets of the pool which included the subject loan transactioneither once or more than once. Plaintiff has requested such information numerous times onlyto be met with complete silence and defiance or obfuscation from the Defendants. 18.There is no assignment of the subject mortgage in the county records, but there is a non-recorded Pooling and Services" Agreement and a non-recorded Assignment and Assumption Agreement which appears to substitute the Trustee over the pooled assets for the nominal Trustee in the Deed of Trust. 18.1. The powers of this second Trustee were in turn transferred to either a Trustee for a Special Investment Vehicle (which performed the accounting and reporting of the pool assets) or to an investment bank Collateral Debt Obligation manager whose department performed the accounting and reporting of the pool assets. 18.2. The reporting of the pool assets consisted principally of descriptions of the notes "signed" by borrowers and limited descriptions of the general terms of the note suchthat the note appeared to be more valuable than the initial terms of payment by the "borrower." 19.The note from the subject "loan transaction" was eventually allocated into a new corporation (Special Purpose Vehicle) formed for the express purpose of holding the pooled assets under certain terms. 19.1. The terms included the allocation of payments from one note to pay any deficiency in payment of another note in unrelated "loan transactions" contrary to the terms of each such note which required payments to be allocated to the principal, interest, escrowand fees associated with only that specific "loan transaction." 19.2. Whether such "deficiency" was caused by the difference between the higher general terms of description of the note or the lower actual payment requirements from the"borrower" is not known, despite numerous requests for accounting and the refusal of Defendants to provide any such information. 0.The Investment Banking firm arranged through payment for a false inflated appraisal of thecertificates and/or issuer of the certificates that would be sold to investors in much the sameway as it had procured the false appraisal of the property that "secured" the "loan transaction." In addition, insurance was purchased from proceeds of this transaction, creditdefault swaps were purchased from proceeds of this transaction, the investors investmentswere "oversold" to create a reserve pool from which the SPV could pay deficiencies in payments, and the SPV created cross-collateralization agreements and overcollateralization of the pool assets to assure payments to the investors, thus creating co-obligors on the payment stream due from the Plaintiff on the subject "loan transaction." 1.The pool assets, including the Plaintiff's subject "loan transaction " were pledged completelyto the owners of the "asset-backed securities." All the certificates were then transferred to aSeller who in turn sold the certificates in varying denominations, each of which had slightlydifferent terms depending upon which segment of the pool (tranche) secured the investment. 2. If there is a holder in due course of the Plaintiff's note arising from the subject "loantransaction" it is the investors who purchased said securities (certificates). Some of saidsecurities are held by the original purchaser thereof, others were sold at weekly auctionmarkets, others were paid by re-sales of property that was "secured", others were paid fromprepayments, others were paid by sale at full or partial price to the investment bank thatoriginated the entire transaction, some of which might be held by the Federal Reserve as non-recourse collateral, and others might have been paid by one or more of the insurance, creditdefault swaps, cross guarantees or cross collateralization of the segment of the pool thatsecured the relevant investor who owned certificates backed by a pool of assets that includedthe subject "loan transaction." 3. It is doubtful that any of the Defendants have any knowledge or have made any effort todetermine whether the putative holders in due course have been paid in whole or in part. Itcan only be said with certainty that these Defendants seek to enforce loan documents for which they have already been paid in full plus illegal fees for participating in an illegal scheme. These Defendants seek to add insult to injury by demanding ownership of the property in addition to the receipt of payment in full long before any delinquency or default even allegedly occurred. 4. In order for these Defendants to maintain legal standing in connection with the subject loan transaction they are required to show the entire chain of title of the note and the entire chainof title of the mortgage. They have refused to do this despite numerous requests, leading PLaintiff to concluded that the Defendants cannot produce such evidence of a complete chain of title or are intentionally withholding the information that would show breaks in such chain. 5.Plaintiff is left in the position of being in an adversary roceeding with ghosts. While these Defendants have informally offered or considered providing indemnification for any third party claims, the fact remains that any relief awarded these defendants, any standing allowed to these defendants would expose the Plaintiff to multiple claims and suits from an unknown number of parties and entities that all claim, possibly correctly, to the holders in due course.Any grant of ac certificate of title to an entity other than Plaintiff or the nominal mortgagee creates an incurable defect in title. 26.There is no recording of any document in the county records which predates the Defendants' attempt to initiate foreclosure and/or eviction or which would authorize them to proceed. Significance of REMIC 27.Mortgage backed Securities (MBS) Certificates are "pass through Certificates," where the Trust has elected to be treated as a Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit ("REMIC") to enjoy the tax exempt status allowed under 15 U.S.C. §§806A-G. 27.1. REMIC regulations impose very strict limitations as to the nature of the investments aREMIC trust may make (i.e. "permitted investments") and transactions which it maynot undertake (i.e. "prohibited transactions"). 27.2. Any violation of REMIC regulations has significant tax implications for the Trust, as well as all Certificate holders. For example, any income realized by the Trust from a "prohibited transaction" is taxed at 100%. 27.2.1. The REMIC regulations also provide that any entity that causes the REMIC regulations to be violated is liable to the Trust and the Certificate holders for the entire amount of the tax. 27.3. Only income from "qualified mortgages" and permitted investments" may enter a REMIC trust. 27.4. A "qualified mortgage" is an obligation (i.e. mortgage) which is principally secured by an interest in real property which (1) was transferred to the Trust on the startup date,(2) was purchased by the REMIC Trust within 3 months after the startup date or (3)any qualified replacement mortgage. 27.5. Permitted investments are limited to: 27.5.1. Cash Flow Investments (i.e. temporary investment where the Trust holds money it has received from qualified mortgages pending distribution to the Certificateholders); 27.5.2. Qualified Reserve Assets (i.e. any intangible property which is held forinvestment and is part of a reasonably required reserve to provide for fullpayment of expenses of the REMIC or amounts due on regular interests in theevent of defaults on qualified mortgages or lower than expected returns on cashflow investments. 27.5.2.1. These investments are for very defined purposes and are to be passive innature. They must be "reasonably required." 27.5.3. Liquidation Proceeds from "foreclosed property" which is acquired in connection with the default or imminent default of a "qualified mortgage" held by the Trust. 28. In order to maintain the REMIC status, the Trustee and the Servicers must ensure that the REMIC receives no income from any asset that is not a "Quailed Mortgage" or a "Permitted Investment." 26 U.S.C. § 806F(a)(2)(B). 28.1. Prohibited Transactions include the disposition of a qualified mortgage (except where the disposition is "incident to" the foreclosure, default, or imminent default of the mortgage); or the receipt of any income from an asset that is not a Qualified Mortgageor a Permitted Investment. 26 U.S.C. § 860F(a)(2)(B). 28.2. Prohibited Transactions are taxed in an amount 100% of the REMIC's net income from such prohibited transaction. 26 U.S.C. § 860F(a)(1). 28.3. Contributions of any "property" – e.g., cash, mortgages, etc. – made to the REMIC areaxed at 100% of the contribution, except for the four following exceptions: 28.3.1. Contributions to facilitate a "clean up call" (i.e. the redemption of a class of 28.3.2. regular interest, when by reason of prior payments with respect to those interests 28.3.3. the administrative costs associated with servicing that class outweigh the benefits 28.3.4. of maintaining the class). Reg. § 1.860G-2(j)(1). 28.3.5. Any cash payment in the nature of a guarantee, such as payments to the REMIC Any violation of REMIC regulations will defeat the privileged tax status and will subject the REMIC to 100% taxation, plus penalties and interest. These taxes and penalties are ultimately borne by the Certificate holders. under a surety bond, letter of credit or insurance policy. 28.3.6. Any cash contribution during the three month period after the start-up day; and Any cash contribution to a qualified reserve fund made by a holder of a residual interest. On a monthly basis, the Investment Banking firm and/or its agents, servants or employees compiled, individually and in concert, oversaw and approved all the information contained in the Distribution Reports and electronically sent same to certain parties. 29.1. Based upon research performed by experts on behalf of the Plaintiff. the data regarding the number of bankruptcies, aggregate Special Servicing Fees, and aggregate Trust Fund Expenses was routinely incomplete, false, and/or misleading. 29.2. Further said report intentionally obfuscated the illegal allocation of payments, the failure to disclose payments, and the effect on the alleged obligation of the Plaintiff, to wit: despite numerous insurance products, credit default swaps, cross collateralization, over collateralization and polling at multiple levels, money received by some or all of these Defendants under the pretense of it being a "Mortgage Payment" was in fact retained, reserved, applied to non-performing loans to make them appear as though they were performing loans, or paid as fees to the enterprise Defendants described in this complaint. 29.3. Based upon the failure of the Defendants to respond, Plaintiff has every reason to believe that the party receiving the payments (Amtrust Bank) is neither the holder in due course of the note nor the owner of any rights under the mortgage provisions of the deed of trust. 29.3.1. Further, Plaintiff has every reason to believe that her payments are not being forwarded to the holder in due course of the note nor to any other authorized party. 29.3.2. Accordingly Plaintiff is in jeopardy, to wit: the true holder in due course and potentially dozens or even thousands of third parties could come forward claiming an unsatisfied interest in the promissory note and may or may not be subject to Plaintiffs various affirmative defenses and counterclaims. "transaction." for example, if the toxic waste paper wold under cover of Plaintiffʼs credit rating and identity was sold at an investment return of 6% and the mortgage note carried a principal balance of $300,000, the enterprise Defendants sold the "investment" certificates on that "loan" for approximately $740,000 and thus received $440,000 in illegal, fraudulent and undisclosed "profits" or "fees" in a $300,000 mortgage transaction.29.3.8.4. Thus the economics of mortgage origination changed, to wit: the worse the loan, the more money the enterprise defendants made as long as there were enough people, like Plaintiff, whose identify was used to hide the high volume ( and high profit) of toxic waste loans. 29.3.8.5. It was thus in the financial interest of the enterprise Defendants to create unrealistic and false market expectations, deceiving the public as a whole in specified geographical areas of the country that were identified by these enterprise Defendants as targets. 29.3.8.6. Since these illegal profits were not disclosed, the Plaintiff is entitled to an accounting and a pro rate share of the profits obtained by the illegal, improper and undisclosed use of her name, credit rating and identity. 29.3.8.7. Based upon the opinion of Plaintiffʼs experts, Plaintiffʼs share of said profits would be in excess of $1 million. 30. The Distribution Reports are supposed to accurately reflect the "financial health of the trust," and provide Certificate holders,with important data such as the number of loans in bankruptcy, the aggregate amount of special servicing fees, and the aggregate amounts of trust fund expenses. Each and every one of these categories is essential for to assess its profit and loss potential in the REMIC entity. Furthermore, this data is used by bond rating agencies to assess the value of the Certificates. 31. Based upon the filings and information of the Plaintiff it appears that no accurate accounting has ever been presented to anyone and that therefore the identity and status of any putative holder in due course is completely shrouded in secrecy enforced by these Defendants, their agents, servants and employees. 31.1. Unreported repurchases of certificates or classes of certificates would and did result in a profit to the REMIC that went unreported, and which was not credited to Borrowers where the repurchase was, as was usually the case, the far less than the original investment. 31.2. While the Plaintiff would never have entered into a transaction in which the true nature of this scheme was revealed, any profits, refunds, rebates, fees, points, costs or other income or gain should be credited on some basis to said borrowers including Plaintiff herein. GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 32. The end result of the false and misleading representations and material omissions of Defendants as to the true nature of the mortgage loan actually being processed, which said Defendants had actual knowledge was in direct conflict with the original Uniform Residential Loan Application, early TIL, and Plaintiff' stated intentions and directions to said Defendants at the time of original application for the loan, fraudulently caused Plaintiff to execute predatory loan documents. 33. At no time whatsoever did Defendants ever advise Plaintiff (nor, as far as Plaintiff can determine, any "investor" in certificates of mortgage-backed securities) that: 33.1. the mortgage loan being processed was not in their best interest; 33.2. the terms of the mortgage loan being processed were less favorable than the fixed-rate loan which Defendants previously advised Plaintiff that they qualified for; 33.3. that the mortgage loan was an inter-temporal transaction (transaction where terms, risks, or provisions at the commencement of the transaction differ at a later time) on which Plaintiff was providing cover for Defendants' illegal activities. 33.4. that Plaintiff would likely be placed in a position of default, foreclosure, and deficiency judgment regardless of whether she met her loan obligations once the true lender or true holder(s) in due course appeared; 33.5. that the originating "lender", that being Defendant Capital Mortgagebanc and/or Amtrust Bank and/or undisclosed third parties, had no intention of retaining ownership interest in the mortgage loan or fully servicing same and in fact may have and probable had already pre-sold the loan, prior to closing, to a third party mortgage aggregator pursuant to previously executed documentation (Assumption and assignment Agreement, Pooling Services Agreement, etc. all executed prior to Plaintiff's "loan Closing." 33.6. that the mortgage loan was actually intended to be repeatedly sold and assigned to multiple third parties, including one or more mortgage aggregators and investment bankers (including but not limited to Defendants DOES 1-10), for the ultimate purpose of bundling the Plaintiff' mortgage with hundreds or perhaps thousands of others as part of a companion, support, or other tranche in connection with the creation of a REMIC security known as a Collateralized Mortgage Obligation ("CMO"), also known as a "mortgage-backed security" to be sold by a securities firm (and which in fact ended up as collateral for Asset-Backed Securities Certificates, created the same year as the closing); 33.7. that the mortgage instrument and Promissory Note may be sold, transferred, or assigned separately to separate third parties so that the later "holder" of the Promissory Note may not be in privity with or have the legal right to foreclose in the event of default; 33.8. that in connection with the multiple downline resale and assignment of the mortgage and Promissory Note that assignees or purchasers of the Note may make "pay-downs" against the Note which may effect the true amount owed by the Plaintiff on the Note; 33.9. that a successive assignee or purchaser of the Note and Mortgage may not, upon assignment or purchase, unilaterally impose property insurance requirements different from those imposed as a condition of the original loan (also known as prohibition against increased forced-placed coverage) without the Plaintiff' prior notice and consent; 34.As a result of the closing and in connection therewith, Defendants placed the Plaintiff into a pool of a sub-prime adjustable rate mortgage programs, with Defendants intentionally misleading Plaintiff and the other borrowers and engaging in material omissions by failing to disclose to Plaintiff and other borrowers the fact that the nature of the mortgage loan applications had been materially changed without Plaintiff's knowledge or consent, and that Plaintiff was being placed into a pool where the usual loan was an adjustable rate mortgage program despite borrowers not being fully qualified for such a program. 35.Prior to the closing, Defendant Capital Mortgagebanc and/or Amtrust Bank and/or undisclosed third parties failed to provide to Plaintiff the preliminary disclosures required by the Truth-In- Lending Act pursuant to 12 CFR (also known as and referred to herein as "Regulation Z) sec. 226.17 and 18, and failed to provide the preliminary disclosures required by the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA") pursuant to 24 FR sec. 3500.6 and 35007, otherwise known as the GFE. 36.Defendant Capital Mortgagebanc and/or Amtrust Bank and/or undisclosed third parties also intentionally failed and/or refused to provide Plaintiff with various disclosures which would indicate to the Plaintiff that the consumer credit contract entered into was void, illegal, and predatory in nature due in part to the fact that the final TIL showed a "fixed rate" schedule of payments, but did not provide the proper disclosures of the actual contractually-due amounts and rates. 37.Defendants failed and/or refused to provide a HUD-1 Settlement Statement at the closing which reflected the true cost of the consumer credit transaction. As Defendants failed to provide an accurate GFE or Itemization of Amount Financed ("IOAF"), there was no disclosure of a Yield Spread Premium ("YSP", which is required to be disclosed by the Truth-In-Lending Act) and thus no disclosure of the true cost of the loan. 38.As a direct and proximate result of these failures to disclose as required by the Truth-In– Lending Act, Defendant MOTION received a YSP in a substantial amount of without preliminary disclosure, which is a per se violation of 12 CFR sec. 226.4(a), 226.17 and 18(d) d (c)(1)(iii). The YSP raised the interest rate which was completely unknown to or approved by the Plaintiff, as they did not received the required GFE or IOAF. 39. In addition, the completely undisclosed YSP was not disclosed by Defendant in their broker contract, which contract was blank in the area as to fees to be paid to Defendant. This is an illegal kickback in violation of 12 USC sec. 2607 as well as State law which gives rise to all damages claims for all combined broker fees, costs, and attorneys' fees. 40.The Amount Financed within the TIL is also understated which is a material violation of 12 CFR sec. 226.17 and 18, in addition to 15 USC sec. 1602(u), as the Amount Financed must be completely accurate with no tolerance. 41.Defendants were under numerous legal obligations as fiduciaries and had the responsibility or overseeing the purported loan consummation to insure that the consummation was legal, proper, and that Plaintiff received all legally required disclosures pursuant to the Truth-In- Lending Act and RESPA both before and after the closing. 42.Plaintiff, not being in the consumer lending, mortgage broker, or residential loan business, reasonably relied upon the Defendants to insure that the consumer credit transaction was legal, proper, and complied with all applicable laws, rules, and Regulations. 43.At all times relevant hereto, Defendants regularly extended or offered to extend consumer credit for which a finance charge is or may be imposed or which, by written agreement, is payable in more than four (4) installments and was initially payable to the person the subject of the transaction, rendering Defendants "creditors" within the meaning of the Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. sec. 1602(f) and Regulation Z sec. 226.2 (a)(17). 44.At the closing of the subject "loan transaction", Plaintiff executed Promissory Notes and Security Agreements in favor of Defendants as aforesaid. These transactions, designated by Defendants as a Loan, extended consumer credit which was subject to a finance charge and which was initially payable to the Defendants. 45.As part of the consumer credit transaction the subject of the closing, Defendants retained a security interest in the subject property which was Plaintiff' principal residential dwelling. 46.Defendants engaged in a pattern and practice of defrauding Plaintiff in that, during the entire life of the mortgage loan, Defendants failed to properly credit payments made; incorrectly calculated interest on the accounts; and have failed to accurately debit fees. At all times material, 47.Defendants had actual knowledge that the Plaintiff' accounts were not accurate but that Plaintiff would make further payments based on Defendants' inaccurate accounts. 48.Plaintiff made payments based on the improper, inaccurate, and fraudulent representations as to Plaintiff' accounts. 49.As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants set forth above, Plaintiff overpaid in interest. 50.Defendants also utilized amounts known to the Defendants to be inaccurate to determine the amount allegedly due and owing for purposes of foreclosure. 51.Defendants' violations were all material in nature under the Truth-In-Lending Act. 52.Said violations, in addition to the fact that Plaintiff did not properly receive Notices of Right to Cancel, constitute violations of 15 USC sec. 1635(a) and (b) and 12 CFR sec. 226.23(b), and are thus a legal basis for and legally extend Plaintiff' right to exercise the remedy of rescission. 53.Defendants assigned or attempted to assign the Note and mortgage to parties who did not take these instruments in good faith or without notice that the instruments were invalid or that Plaintiff had a claim in recoupment. Pursuant to ORC sec. 1303.32(A)(2)(b)(c) and (f), Defendants are not a holder indue course and is thus liable to Plaintiff, individually, jointly and severally. 54. On information and belief and given that the consumer credit transaction was an inter- temporal transaction with multiple assignments as part of an aggregation and the creation of a REMIC tranche itself a part of a predetermined and identifiable CMO, all Defendants shared in the illegal proceeds of the transaction; conspired with each other to defraud the Plaintiff out of the proceeds of the loan; acted in concert to wrongfully deprive the Plaintiff of their residence; acted in concert and conspiracy to essentially steal the Plaintiff' home and/or convert the Plaintiff' home without providing Plaintiff reasonably equivalent value in exchange; and conducted an illegal enterprise within the meaning of the RICO statute. 55. On information and belief and given the volume of residential loan transactions solicited and processed by the Defendants, the Defendants have engaged in two or more instances of racketeering activity involving different victims but utilizing the same method, means, mode, operation, and enterprise with the same intended result. Claims for Relief COUNT I: VIOLATIONS OF HOME OWNERSHIP EQUITY PROTECTION ACT 56. Plaintiff reaffirm and reallege the above paragraphs 1-52 hereinabove as if set forth more fully hereinbelow. 57. In 1994, Congress enacted the Home Ownership Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA") which is codified at 15 USC sec. 1639 et seq. with the intention of protecting homeowners from predatory lending practices targeted at vulnerable consumers. HOEPA requires lenders to make certain defined disclosures and prohibits certain terms from being included in home loans. In the event of noncompliance, HOEPA imposes civil liability for rescission and statutory and actual damages. 58. Plaintiff are "consumers" and each Defendant is a "creditor" as defined by HOEPA. In the mortgage loan transaction at issue here, Plaintiff were required to pay excessive fees, expenses, and costs which exceeded more than 10% of the amount financed. 59. Pursuant to HOEPA and specifically 15 USC sec. 1639(a)(1), each Defendant is required to make certain disclosures to the Plaintiff which are to be made conspicuously and in writing no later than three (3) days prior to the closing. 60. In the transaction at issue, Defendants were required to make the following disclosure to Plaintiff by no later than three (3) days prior to said closing: 60.1. "You are not required to complete this agreement merely because you have received these disclosures or have signed a loan application. If you obtain this loan, the lender will have a mortgage on your home. You could lose your home and any money you have put into it, if you do not meet your obligation under the loan." 61.Defendants violated HOEPA by numerous acts and material omissions, including but not limited to: 61.1. (a) failing to make the foregoing disclosure in a conspicuous fashion; 61.2. (b) engaging in a pattern and practice of extending credit to Plaintiff without regard to their ability to repay in violation of 15 USC sec. 1639(h). 62.By virtue of the Defendants' multiple violations of HOEPA, Plaintiff have a legal right to rescind the consumer credit transaction the subject of this action pursuant to 15 USC sec. 1635. This Complaint is to be construed, for these purposes, as formal and public notice of Plaintiff's Notice of Rescission of the mortgage and note. 63.Defendants further violated HOEPA by failing to make additional disclosures, including but not limited to Plaintiff not receiving the required disclosure of the right to rescind the transaction; 64. the failure of Defendants to provide an accurate TIL disclosure; and the amount financed being understated. 65.As a direct consequence of and in connection with Plaintiff' legal and lawful exercise of their right of rescission, the true "lender" is required, within twenty (20) days of this Notice of Rescission, to: 65.1. (a) desist from making any claims for finance charges in the transaction; 65.2. (b) return all monies paid by Plaintiff in connection with the transaction to the Plaintiff; 65.3. (c) satisfy all security interests, including mortgages, which were acquired in the transaction. 66.Upon the true "lenders" full performance of its obligations under HOEPA, Plaintiff shall tender all sums to which the true lender is entitled. 67. Based on Defendants' HOEPA violations, each of the Defendants is liable to the Plaintiff for the following, which Plaintiff demand as relief: 67.1. (a) rescission of the mortgage loan transactions; 67.2. (b) termination of the mortgage and security interest in the property the subject of the mortgage loan documents created in the transaction; 67.3. (c) return of any money or property paid by the Plaintiff including all payments made in connection with the transactions; 67.4. (d) an amount of money equal to twice the finance charge in connection with the transactions; 67.5. (e) relinquishment of the right to retain any proceeds; and 67.6. (f) actual damages in an amount to be determined at trial, including 67.7. attorneys' fees. COUNT II: VIOLATIONS OF REAL ESTATE SETTLEMENT PROCEDURES ACT 68. Plaintiff reaffirm and reallege paragraphs 1-52 above herein as if specifically set forth more fully hereinbelow. 69. As mortgage lenders, Defendants are subject to the provisions of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 USC sec. 2601 et seq. 70. In violation of 12 USC sec. 2607 and in connection with the mortgage loan to Plaintiff, Defendants accepted charges for the rendering of real estate services which were in fact charges for other than services actually performed. 71. As a result of the Defendants' violations of RESPA, Defendants are liable to Plaintiff in an amount equal to three (3) times the amount of charges paid by Plaintiff for "settlement services" pursuant to 12 USC sec. 2607 (d)(2). COUNT III: VIOLATIONS OF FEDERAL TRUTH-IN-LENDING ACT 72. Plaintiff reaffirm and realleges paragraphs 1-52 above hereinabove as if set forth more fully herein below. 73. Defendants failed to include and disclose certain charges in the finance charge shown on the TIL statement, which charges were imposed on Plaintiff incident to the extension of credit to the Plaintiff and were required to be disclosed pursuant to 15 USC sec. 1605 and Regulation Z 74. sec. 226.4, thus resulting in an improper disclosure of finance charges in violation of 15 USC sec. 1601 et seq., Regulation Z sec. 226.18(d). Such undisclosed charges include a sum dentified on the Settlement Statement listing the amount financed which is different from the sum listed on the original Note. 75. By calculating the annual percentage rate ("APR") based upon improperly calculated and disclosed amounts, Defendants are in violation of 15 USC sec. 1601 et seq., Regulation Z sec. 226.18(c), 18(d), and 22. 76. Defendants' failure to provide the required disclosures provides Plaintiff with the right to rescind the transaction, and Plaintiff, through this public Complaint which is intended to be construed, for purposes of this claim, as a formal Notice of Rescission, hereby elect to rescind the transaction. COUNT IV: VIOLATION OF FAIR CREDIT REPORTING ACT 77. Plaintiff reaffirm and reallege paragraphs 1-52 above as if set forth more fully hereinbelow. 78. At all times material, Defendants qualified as a provider of information to the Credit Reporting Agencies, including but not limited to Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion, under the Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. 65. Defendants wrongfully, improperly, and illegally reported negative information as to the Plaintiff to one or more Credit Reporting Agencies, resulting in Plaintiff having negative information on their credit reports and the lowering of their FICO scores. 78.1. The negative information included but was not limited to an excessive amount of debt into which Plaintiff was tricked and deceived into signing. 78.2. Notwithstanding the above, Plaintiff has paid each and every payment on time from the time of the loan closing through the present. 79.Pursuant to 15 USC sec. 1681(s)(2)(b), Plaintiff are entitled to maintain a private cause of action against Defendants for an award of damages in an amount to be proven at the time of trial for all violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act which caused actual damages to Plaintiff, including emotional distress and humiliation. 80.Plaintiff are entitled to recover damages from Defendants for negligent non-compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act pursuant to 15 USC sec. 1681(o). 81.Plaintiff are also entitled to an award of punitive damages against Defendants for their willful noncompliance with the Fair Credit Reporting Act pursuant to 15 USC sec. 1681(n)(a)(2) in an amount to be proven at time of trial. COUNT VII: FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION 82.Plaintiff reaffirm and reallege paragraphs 1-52 above as if set forth more fully hereinbelow. 83.Defendants knowingly and intentionally concealed material information from Plaintiff which is required by Federal Statutes and Regulations to be disclosed to the Plaintiff both before and at the closing. 84.Defendants also materially misrepresented material information to the Plaintiff with full knowledge by Defendants that their affirmative representations were false, fraudulent, and misrepresented the truth at the time said representations were made. 85.Under the circumstances, the material omissions and material misrepresentations of the Defendants were malicious. 86.Plaintiff, not being an investment banker, securities dealer, mortgage lender, mortgage broker, or mortgage lender, reasonably relied upon the representations of the Defendants in agreeing to execute the mortgage loan documents. 87.Had Plaintiff known of the falsity of Defendants' representations, Plaintiff would not have entered into the transactions the subject of this action. 88.As a direct and proximate cause of the Defendants' material omissions and material misrepresentations, Plaintiff have suffered damages. COUNT VIII: BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY 89. Plaintiff reaffirm and reallege paragraphs 1-52 above as if set forth more fully hereinbelow. 90. Defendants, by their actions in contracting to provide mortgage loan services and a loan program to Plaintiff which was not only to be best suited to the Plaintiff given their income and expenses but by which Plaintiff would also be able to satisfy their obligations without risk of losing their home, were "fiduciaries" in which Plaintiff reposed trust and confidence, especially given that Plaintiff were not and are not investment bankers, securities dealers, mortgage lenders, mortgage brokers, or mortgage lenders. 91. Defendants breached their fiduciary duties to the Plaintiff by fraudulently inducing Plaintiff to enter into a mortgage transaction which was contrary to the Plaintiff's stated intentions; contrary to the Plaintiff's interests; and contrary to the Plaintiff's preservation of their home 92. As a direct and proximate result of the Defendants' breaches of their fiduciary duties, Plaintiff have suffered damages. 93. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Defendants' actions were willful, wanton, intentional, and with a callous and reckless disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff justifying an award of not only actual compensatory but also exemplary punitive damages to serve as a deterrent not only as to future conduct of the named Defendants herein, but also to other persons or entities with similar inclinations. COUNT IX: UNJUST ENRICHMENT 94. Plaintiff reallege and reaffirm paragraphs 1-52 above as if set forth more fully hereinbelow. 95. Defendants had an implied contract with the Plaintiff to ensure that Plaintiff understood all fees which would be paid to the Defendants to obtain credit on Plaintiff' behalf and to not charge any fees which were not related to the settlement of the loan and without fulldisclosure to Plaintiff. 96.Defendants cannot, in good conscience and equity, retain the benefits from their actions ofcharging a higher interest rate, fees. rebates, kickbacks, profits (including but not limited tofrom resale of mortgages and notes using Plaintiff's identity, credit score and reputationwithout consent, right, justification or excuse as part of an illegal enterprise scheme) andgains and YSP fee unrelated to the settlement services provided at closing. 97. Defendants have been unjustly enriched at the expense of the Plaintiff, and maintenance of the enrichment would be contrary to the rules and principles of equity. 97.1. Defendants have also been additionally enriched through the receipt of PAYMENT from third parties including but not limited to investors, insurers, and other borrowers, the United States Department of the Treasury, the United States Federal Reserve, and Bank of America, N.A. 98. Plaintiff thus demands restitution from the Defendants in the form of actual damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys' fees. COUNT X: CIVIL CONSPIRACY 99.Plaintiff reaffirm and reallege paragraphs 1-52 above as if set forth more fully hereinbelow. 100.In connection with the application for and consummation of the mortgage loan the subject of this action, Defendants agreed, between and among themselves, to engage in actions and a course of conduct designed to further an illegal act or accomplish a legal act by unlawful means, and to commit one or more overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy to defraud the Plaintiff. 101.Defendants agreed between and among themselves to engage in the conspiracy to defraudfor the common purpose of accruing economic gains for themselves at the expense of anddetriment to the Plaintiff. 102. The actions of the Defendants were committed intentionally, willfully, wantonly, and withreckless disregard for the rights of the Plaintiff. 103. As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants in combination resulting infraud and breaches of fiduciary duties, Plaintiff have suffered damages. 104. Plaintiff thus demand an award of actual, compensatory, and punitive damages. COUNT XI: CIVIL RICO 105.Plaintiff reaffirm and reallege paragraphs 1-52 above as set forth more fully hereinbelow. 106.Defendants are "persons" as defined by ORC sec. 2923.31(G). 107.The conspiracy the subject of this action has existed from date of application to the present, with the injuries and damages resulting therefrom being continuing. 108.Defendants' actions and use of multiple corporate entities, multiple parties, and concerted and predetermined acts and conduct specifically designed to defraud Plaintiff constitutes an"enterprise", with the aim and objective of the enterprise being to perpetrate a fraud upon thePlaintiff through the use of intentional nondisclosure, material misrepresentation, andcreation of fraudulent loan documents. 109.Each of the Defendants is an "enterprise Defendant". 110.As a direct and proximate result of the actions of the Defendants, Plaintiff have and continue to suffer damages. COMPLAINT TO QUIET TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY 111. Plaintiff reaffirm and reallege paragraphs 1-52 above as set forth more fully hereinbelow. 112. Plaintiff has sent or has caused to be sent authorized Qualified Written Requests to the only known Defendants which the said Defendants have failed and refused to answer despite acknowledging receipt thereof and despite demands from counsel, a copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as specifically as if set forth at length hereat. 113. Plaintiff has sent or has caused to be sent notice of her intent to rescind the subject loan transaction but has only sent those notices to the only entities that have been disclosed. Hence, without this action, neither the rescission nor the reconveyance which the Plaintiff is entitled to file (as attorney in fact for the originating lender) and will file contemporaneously with this complaint, gives Plaintiff full and clear title to the property. 114.The real party in interest on the lender side may be the owner of the asset backed security issued by the SPV, the insurer through some claim of equitable interest, or the Federal government through the United States Department of the Treasury or the Federal Reserve. The security is a "securitized" bond deriving its value from the underlying mortgages of which the subject mortgage is one. Thus Plaintiff is entitled to quiet title against Defendants, clearing title of the purported subject mortgage encumbrance. 115. Plaintiff is ignorant of the true names and capacities of defendants sued herein as DOES inclusive, and therefore sues these defendants by such fictitious names. Plaintiff will amend this complaint to allege their true names and capacities when ascertained. 116. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that, at all times herein mentioned,each of the defendants sued herein was the agent and employee of each of the remainingdefendants and was at all times acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and employment. 117. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that and each of the Defendantsclaim or might claim an interest in the property adverse to plaintiff herein. However, the claim of said Defendants is without any right whatsoever, and said Defendant have no legal or equitable right, claim, or interest in said property. 118. Plaintiff therefore seeks a declaration that the title to the subject property is vested in plaintiff alone and that the defendants herein, and each of them, be declared to have no estate,right, title or interest in the subject property and that said defendants and each of them, beforever enjoined from asserting any estate, right, title or interest in the subject property adverse to plaintiff herein. 119. WHEREFORE, in this Count, plaintiff prays this Court will enter judgment against defendants and each of them, as follows: 119.1. For an order compelling said Defendant, and each of them, to transfer or release legal title and alleged encumbrances thereon and possession of the subject property to Plaintiff herein; 119.2. For a declaration and determination that Plaintiff is the rightful holder of title to the property and that Defendant herein, and each of them, be declared to have no estate, right, title or interest in said property; 119.3. For a judgment forever enjoining said defendants, and each of them, from claiming any estate, right, title or interest in the subject property; 119.4. For costs of suit herein incurred; 119.5. For such other and further relief as the court may deem proper USURY and FRAUD 119.6. Plaintiff reaffirm and reallege the above paragraphs 1-52 hereinabove as if set forthmore fully hereinbelow. The subject loan, note, and mortgage was structured so as tocreate the appearance of a higher value of the real property than the actual fair market value. 119.7. Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that, at all times herein mentioned, each of the defendants sued herein was the agent and employee of each of the remaining defendants and was at all times acting within the purpose and scope of such agency and employment.119.8. Defendants disguised the transaction to create the appearance of the lender being a properly chartered and registered financial institution authorized to do business and to enter into the subject transaction when in fact the real party in interest was not disclosed to Plaintiff, as aforesaid, and neither were the various fees, rebates, refunds, kickbacks, profits and gains of the various parties who participated in this unlawful scheme. 119.9.Said real party in interest, i.e., the source of funding for the loan and the person to whom the note was transmitted or eventually "assigned" was neither a financial institution nor an entity or person authorized, chartered or registered to do business in this State nor to act as banking, lending or other financial institution anywhere else. 119.10. As such, this fraudulent scheme, (which was in actuality a plan to trick the Plaintiffinto signing what would become a negotiable security used to sell unregulatedsecurities under fraudulent and changed terms from the original note) was in fact asham to use Plaintiff's interest in the real property to collect interest in excess of thelegal rate. 119.11. The transaction involved a loan of money pursuant to a written agreement, and assuch, subject to the rate limitation set forth under state and federal law. The "formula rate" referenced in those laws was exceeded by a factor in excess of 10 contrary to the applicable law and contrary to the requirements for disclosure under TILA and HOEPA. 119.12. Under Applicable law, the interest charged on this usurious mortgage prevents any collection or enforcement of principal or interest of the note, voids any security interest thereon, and entitles the Plaintiff to recovery of all money or value paid to Defendants, plus treble damages, interest, and attorney fees. 119.13. Under Applicable Law Plaintiff are also entitled and demand a permanent injunction be entered against the Defendants (a) preventing them from taking any action or making any report in furtherance of collection on this alleged debt which was usurious, as aforesaid (b) requiring the records custodian of the county in which the alleged mortgage and other instruments are recorded to remove same from the record, (c) allowing the filing of said order in the office of the clerk of the property records where the subject property, "Loan transaction" and any other documents relating to this transaction are located and (d) dissolving any lis pendens or notice of pendency relating to the Defendants purported claim. RELIEF SOUGHT WHEREFORE, having set forth numerous legally sufficient causes of actions against the Defendants, Plaintiff pray for the entry of Final Judgment against all Defendants jointly and severally in an amount not yet quantified but to be proven at trial and such other amounts to be proven at trial, and for costs and attorneys' fees; that the Court find that the ransactions thesubject of this action are illegal and are deemed void; that the foreclosure which was instituted be deemed and declared illegal and void and that further proceedings in connection with the foreclosure be enjoined; and for any other and further relief which is just and proper. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL Plaintiff demand trial by jury of all matters so triable as a matter of right. Respectfully submitted, _____________________________ Plaintiff _____________________________ ATTORNEY NAME BAR NUMBER Pro Hac Vice, Counsel to Plaintiff ATTORNEY ADDRESS PHONE Fax: VERIFICATION I, am the Plaintiff in the above-entitled action. I have read the foregoingand know the contents thereof. The same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein alleged on information and belief, and as to those matters, I believe it to be true. I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct and that this declaration was executed at Phoenix, Arizona. **Only a licensed attorney can represent your rights - Call your local state bar - This site is informational only ** Not licensed to practice law.

Lenders who Lied about Loan Modification Programs

Avoid Foreclosure and Bankruptcy Blog » Lenders who Lied about ...

Jun 23, 2010 ... The attorney will be able to cut through the lender lies and review the true financial status of the borrower in order to paint

THIS IS NOT TO BE CONSTRUED AS LEGAL ADVICE!!

By filing a response, you tell the court that you contest the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint and force the plaintiff to prove their case in order to win.

If you don’t file a timely response, the plaintiff can petition the court for a “default judgment” and possibly win the lawsuit simply because you failed to respond.

First call an Attorney Immediately. An attorney experienced in defending against the type of lawsuit you’ve been served with will undoubtedly be the best tool in your defense toolbox.

Lawyers are knowledgeable about the procedures involved in lawsuits and skilled at making persuasive arguments to a judge or a jury in your defense. An attorney can also help you try to settle the case out of court as an alternative.This blog only describes situational circumstances and no witness can offer legal advice. M.Soliman is an "expert witness" and not an attorney nor affiliated under a licensed prationer.

This web site does NOT advocate nor believe that modifications exist and will not be involvved in any modificiation or other short sale settlement offers.

Consult an attorney first for your specific problem. NO attorney-client relationship exists.